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Logic does not appear to be driving the decision roaming process; bureaucratic politics has played a major role in getting us to where we are today. In this paper I will address two salient questions which, on the surface, would not have to be asked if simple logic prevailed: o Why did the Air Force cancel its ASAT program and thus apparently abdicate a mission area which At must feel responsible for? o Why do the Army and Navy think they can succeed in developing ASAT's while the Air Force did not?
In the course of addressing these questions, I'll begln by setting the bacMground some history leading to the Air Force's cancellation decision. Next, I'll at%erupt to answer the two questions by looming at Air Force, OSD, Army~ and Navy positions.
The paper wlll conclude wlth lessons to be learned from this case study. In the early 1960's the Navy studied non-nuclear ASAT's based on a warhead that dispersed a cloud of pellets designed to shred the target. The Navy ran exploratory air launched tests in
BACKGROUND

1962.
In addition to the Air Force and Navy efforts, the Army developed an ASAT derived from their NIke Zeus interceptor missile.
As with the Air Force system, the Nlke Zeus also felled upon a nuclear warhead. Failure to provide a deterrent in-klnd to the operation Soviet system would perpetuate the existing destabilizing situation in which the Soviet Union has an uncontested capability to attack our space systems, secure in the Knowledge that their systems are not vulnerable to counterattacK.
The executive position has maintained a steady course for years.
We need ASAT for two purposes.
The first is to act as a deterrent to Soviet use o~ their ASAT.
IT we don't have an ASAT then they can take out our satellites and our only two responses With the background set, we can turn our attention to addressing the two questions.
AIR FORCE STORY
The first and most important question is why did the Air Because of the bans, the investment was effectively being wasted.
Support for the system was eroding in the Air Force because the ALMV ASAT would be expensive to procure and operate. Les Aucoin (D -OR) and Lawrence Coughlln (R-PA), failed in their bid to include a ban on the ALMV ASAT.
Their ~ailure was primarily due to their over-zealous attempt to institute a permanent ban rather than the annual, one year bans they had success~ully included in the appropriations bills the three previous years.
Other ASAT is the Navy's desired approach.
But the Navy blundered and is now at the fiscal mercy of the Army. At one point, while the Air Force was cancelling its ASAT, OSD loaded ASAT funding into the Navy budget. It appeared as if the Navy might get the lead on weapon development. However, in the midst of a budget cutting activity, the Navy offered up the ASAT money to cove~" its share of tl%e cuts. OSD was not amused.
OSD transferred the ASAT funds to the Army and still dunned the Navy for its share of the budget cut.
The ASAT role would have provided the Navy more inroads into space.
The Navy has had some significant interest and assets in space, but they haven't been heavily involved in the SDI. Despite the difficulties, I learned more about the ASAT and much about the bureaucratic process of decision making in the Pentagon.
16
